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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Phil L. Hansen, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, a municipal 
corporation, by and through its BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, Mayor J. Bracken Lee, 
and Commissioners George B. Catmull, Louis 
E. Holley, Conrad B. Harrison, and James 
L. Barker, Jr.; its CHIEF OF POLICE, Dewey 
J. Fillis; and/or its LICENSE ASSESSOR, 
Thad Emery, Defendant-Respondent. 
THE VAGABOND CLUB, et al., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation, 
et al., Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11047 
(Consolidated 
with 
No. 11174 
Case No. 
11174 
(Consolidated 
with 
No.11047 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT- RESPONDENT 
IN CASE NO. 11047 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
IN CASE NO. 11174 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah is seeking a declaratory judg-
ment and to enjoin Salt Lake City from the enforcement 
of the municipal ordinance which licenses and regulates 
1 
nonprofit social clubs, athletic and recreational asso-
ciations. This case which has been consolidated with 
the case involving seven private clubs who filed an 
action against Salt Lake City to enjoin the enforcement 
of this same ordinance against them individually. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
After the issuance of a temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction, the matter was tried 
before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
After argument of counsel and briefs submitted on the 
law, Judge Anderson issued a memorandum decision 
which held that the ordinance was passed pursuant to 
a grant of power contained in Section 10-8-81, U.C.A. 
1953 and that said statute was proper and constitu-
tional. The court further found that Section 11-10-1, 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended by the 1967 Legislature ex-
tended to the city the right to license and regulate non-
profit corporations in addition to all others pertaining 
to the consumption of liquor. It further found that 
Section 10-8-42, U.C.A. 1953, and the grant of power 
contained therein and in co-application with the above 
two sections, gave to Salt Lake City the right to regu-
late liquo~ as long as the ordinance passed for that 
purpose was not prohibited by the Legislature or in 
conflict with the state liquor laws. The court concluded 
that the state had failed to meet the burden of establish-
ing that defendants' ordinance was either in con-
2 
travention of law or unconstitutional and, in any event, 
that the state is not a proper party to raise that question 
in this case. 
The consolidated cases of the private clubs against 
Salt Lake City were filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County and a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction was issued 
therefrom. That court asked that a Judge outside the 
jurisdiction be assigned to hear this matter and the 
case came on before Judge F. "\V. Keller on the 1st 
day of November, 1967, in his courtroom at Price, 
Utah, wherein argument of counsel was heard and a 
proper amount of time was allowed for counsel to 
prepare briefs in support of their arguments. On De-
cember 7, Judge Keller issued a declaratory judgment 
in which he found that the grant of power contained 
in Section 10-8-81, U.C.A. 1953, gave the city the right 
to regulate and license the clubs then before the court. 
Secondly, the court found that in eliminating the provi-
sions from Section 11-10-1 excepting nonprofit corpora-
tions, the 1967 Legislature intended that the city have 
the right to license and regulate the liquor locker clubs 
as pertaining to the consumption of liquor. That 
pursuant to the grant of power given in Section 10-
8-42, U.C.A. 1953, and as applied in conjunction with 
the above sections that Salt Lake City had the right 
to regulate liquor as long as the ordinance passed for 
that purpose was not specifically prohibited by the 
Legislature or in conflict with the state liquor laws. 
He denied the plaintiffs' contentions therein that Sec-
3 
tion 11-10-1 through 4, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, was 
unconstitutional and held that the ordinance, Section 
20-29-1 through 25, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 1965, was valid except for the provisions 
requiring that the chief of police be given a key to the 
premises of the clubs and that police officers may enter 
the club house without a search warrant. Thus requiring 
the officers to procure a proper search warrant prior 
to their inspecting the clubrooms or the premises. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The city desires that the decision of the Honorable 
Aldon J. Anderson be upheld in its entirety and that 
in the consolidated cases involving the private clubs 
that the decision of Judge Keller be upheld except 
for that portion which requires that police officers pro-
cure search warrants prior to inspection of the club, 
premises and seeks that that portion of the judgment 
be reversed thereby authorizing the peace officers to 
enter the clubs pursuant to the ordinance and that the 
club owners furnish a key or other device which will 
allow immediate access to the clubrooms. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The city enacted its ordinance on May 9, 1967, 
desiring to regulate and license all nonprofit clubs and 
associations, said ordinance to be effective one month 
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after it~ passage by the Salt Lake City Commission. 
The day before the ordinance was to become effective, 
the State of Utah through its Attorney General filed 
this action to enjoin the enforcement of said ordinance 
and declare the ordinance null and void. 
Upon the decision of the Honorable Aldon J. 
Anderson, the Attorney General appealed to this honor-
able court for a temporary injunction staying the 
enforcement of said ordinance, said petition was denied. 
Immediately after such denial, the seven private clubs, 
( consolidaed case No. 1117 4,) filed an action to enjoin 
the enforcement of this ordinance as pertaining to them 
and for a declaration that said ordinance was improper 
and unconstitutional. All other clubs who come within 
the ordinance have been licensed by Salt Lake City's 
license assessor. A copy of the ordinance is repeated 
in its entirety in the record of case no. 11047 (R 25-27). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CITY HAS THE RIGHT TO LICENSE 
AND REGULATE SOCIAL, RECREATIONAL 
AND ATHLETIC CLUBS AND ASSOCIA-
TIONS. 
In the recent case of Salt Lake City v. Town House 
thletic Club et al., 18 U.2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 (1967), 
this court clearly established the power of a municipal 
5 
corporation to license and regulate nonprofit social clubs 
and said: 
" ... as presently granted by Section 10-8-81, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, the city may license 
and regulate non-profit social clubs but it may 
do so only once." 
The statute that gives to the municipality this authority 
reads as follows : 
"10-8-81. Social clubs and athletic associa-
tions-Regulation.-They niay regulate all so-
cial club_s, recreational associations, athletic 
associations and kindred associations, whether 
incorporated or not, which maintain club rooms 
or regular meeting rooms within the corporate 
limits of the city." 
In that case defendant's sole defense was based upon 
its allegation that the control of the nonprofit corpora-
tions organized as liquor locker clubs was vested solely 
in the Secretary of State. This control having been 
preempted by the state pursuant to Sections 16-6-13 
through 15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and Section 
11-10-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as then written). 
The court considered this matter fully and found: 
"The statutes cited above and relied upon 
by the _clubs do not, except perhaps as regards 
the activities of storing and consuming liquor, 
remove from municipal corporations the power 
to license and regulate activities of non-profit 
social clubs, to the extent such power may have 
been delegated to them by other, though earlier, 
statutes. 'Ve do not here hold that, as regards 
6 
the activity of storage and consumption of liquor 
the regulatory power is in fact pre-empted to th~ 
State. That issue is not before us in this case." 
There can Le no doubt from the court's decision in the 
Towne House case and its interpretation of Section 
10-8-81, U.C.A. 1953, that municipalities have the right 
to regulate and license social clubs, athletic and recrea-
tional associations located within the boundaries of said 
city. 
The defendant heeding the instructions of this 
Court in the Towne House case then passed an all 
inclusive "one" ordinance covering the regulation of 
all activities of social clubs, athletic and recreational 
associations. (Section 20-29-1 to 25, Revised Ordi-
nances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, a copy of the 
ordinance being attached and made a part of plaintiff's 
complaint.) 
The Attorney General in his brief filed in this 
matter in numerous passages has alluded to the fact 
that Salt Lake City's ordinance was written only to 
"persecute" liquor locker clubs which are situated within 
Salt Lake City. A very cursory reading of the ordi-
nance in question would readily expose the fact that 
this ordiance is intended to apply to all social, recrea-
tional and athletic clubs of a nonprofit nature. Even 
the Ladies Literary Club, wherein no liquor con-
sumption, storage or sale takes place is included and 
classified as a Class A club. All clubs are required 
to comply with the health, fire and such other regulations 
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as need be promulgated to protect the general welfare 
of the community as outlined in Sections 12 13 17 , ' ' 
18 and 19 of the ordinance. 
The regulation of consumption of liquor and beer 
along with other activities were included. All regulatory 
licenses which had previously been purchased by the 
clubs and associations from defendant covering such 
things as dancing, beer consumption, restaurants, coin 
operated amusement and music devices and card tables, 
could no longer be issued because of the "Towne House" 
case decision. 
The court did not decide if the city had the right 
to regulate and license these clubs for liquor consump-
tion. This then is the issue before us in the present case. 
POINT II 
THE CITY HAS PO,VER TO CONTROL 
AND LICENSE CONSUMPTION OF LIQUOR 
IN ALL ESTABLISHMENTS INCLUDING 
PRIVATE CLUBS. 
The 1959 Legislature expressly gave to the city 
the right to license and regulate the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages in all establishments except those 
nonprofit corporations which were organized under 
Section 16-6~13 through 13.3, U.C.A. and known as 
liquor locker clubs. The 1967 Legislature eliminated 
from Section 11-10-1, U.C.A. 1953, that part which 
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specifically excludes the liquor locker clubs. Our Su-
preme Court interpreted this section when it said: 
"Section 11-10-1, U.C.A. '53 enacted in 1959, 
delegates to cities the power to regulate 'all es-
tablishments, associations and corporations' ex-
cept those covered by Section 16-6-13 to 13.3, 
U.C.A. 1953 (said exception since removed by 
1967 Legislature) who 'operate a club, business 
or association which allows the customers, mem-
bers or guests to possess or consume liquor on 
the premises, provided the license does not permit 
the licensee, operator or employee of either to 
hold, store or possess liquor or the premises' ". 
(Emphasis and explanation ours) Salt Lake 
City vs. Towne House Athletic Assoc., op. cit. 
By its elimination of the exception in the above 
law, the Legislature clearly intended that the local 
subdivision have power and control over the consump-
tion of liquor in liquor locker clubs. There can be no 
doubt that the Legislature desired that the local gov-
erning bodies who are now charged with enforcement 
of the state liquor laws be empowered to exercise 
control over not only businesses and nonprofit organi-
zations which are not corporations but also the liquor 
locker clubs. 
It is the contention of the Attorney General that 
this statute is but a mandatory licensing provision for 
revenue purposes without any power to regulate the 
consumption of liquor (allegation #12 of the State's 
complaint). The power to license comes under either 
the police power or the taxing power. To help clarify 
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respondent's position, we quote from 33 Am. Jur., 
Licenses, § 19: 
"The name given a license law by the legisla-
ture is not controlling, but in the last analysis, 
whether an imposition is in fact a tax or an aid 
to regulation is to be determined by the sub-
stance of the law imposing it. A license imposi-
tion upon a business or occupation which is not 
calling for police regulations is a revenue tax. 
However, a license enactment is a tax when, 
and only when, revenue is the main purpose 
for which it is imposed. In general, therefore, 
where the fee is imposed for the purpose of regu-
lation, and the statute requires compliance with 
certain conditions in addition to the payment 
of the prescribed sum, such sum is a license 
proper, imposed by virtue of the police power; 
but where it is exacted soley for revenue pur-
poses and its payment gives the right to carry 
on the business without any further conditions, 
it is a tax." 33 Am. Jur., Licenses, §19. 
A look at the very basic nature of the thing to be 
licensed, liquor consumption, brings the conclusion that 
it comes strictly within the police power. There is no 
right either natural or constitutional within an indi-
vidual or legal entity in the consumption or sale of 
liquor. Randles v. Washington State Liquor Board, 
33Wash.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 531. 
"The manufacture or sale of intoxicating 
liquors, and even their possession or use, is not 
a matter of common, inherent, or natural right, 
but, if a right at all, is one held subject to the 
police power of the state." Green Mountain 
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Post v. Liquor Control Board, 117 Vt. 405, 94 
A.2d 230, 35 A.L.R.2d 1060. 
This court has reached the same decision in Riggins 
vs. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 
51 P.2d 645 (1935). 
In Provo City vs. Provo Meat and Packing Co., 
49 Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, Ann. Cas. 1918 D 530, 
(1917), this court established that the right to regulate 
carries with it the right to license and impose a fee. 
The questoin now before the court is whether the right 
to license conversely carries with it the right to regulate. 
It is the position of respondent that it clearly has the 
power of regulation particularly when dealing with a 
subject which is so very clearly within the police power. 
In taking a close look at the entire "set up law" 
itself, one finds that it is meant to be regulatory inas-
much as the subsequent sections 2 through 4 prescribe 
qualifications and requirements pertaining to the license 
and limits the amount of fee to be charged which indi-
cates that it is a regulatory license and not for revenue 
only. If we, therefore, follow the general rule of statu-
tory construction to consider the entire statute as a 
whole, we see that this statute conveys to the political 
subdivision the power to regulate the consumption of 
liquor. 
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POINT III 
THE STATE HAS NOT PREEl\IPTED TO 
ITSELF THE CONTROL OF LIQUOR. 
One will not find within the State Liquor Code 
Title 32, U.C.A.) an express or implied statement that 
the Legislature intended to preempt the control of 
liquor strictly to itself. This court has held that the 
Legislature must be clear in its expression of its inten-
tion to preempt to itself the regulation of any activity 
which may occur within the state. Salt Lake City vs. 
K usse, 97 U tab 113, 93 P .2d 671 ( 1938) . 
The Attorney General spent innumerable pages in 
his brief outlining the history of liquor consumption 
statutes since the first pioneer entered the Great Salt 
Lake Valley. This history was very interesting but of no 
value in that the Legislature completely revised the 
statutes of the State of Utah in 1933. At that time the 
predecessors of Sections 10-8-81 and 10-8-42 were in-
cluded in the new statutes clearly exhibiting an intention 
on the part of the Legislature to continue those powers 
and controls in the hands of the local and political sub-
divisions. 
The State Liquor Code was passed by the follow-
ing session in 1935. It could have clearly eliminated 
the effect of Section 10-8-42 and Section 10-8-81 by 
making a ·positive statement that the state desired to 
preempt to itself the regulation of intoxicating liquors 
but did not do so. We are, therefore, required to pre-
sume that the Legislature intended the local governing 
unit to continue to have such authority as expressed 
in these two sections. 
12 
Section 10-8-42, U.C.A. is as much in effect today 
as when it was originally passed. The cities are granted 
the power to prohibit "except as otherwise provided 
by law" any person from illegally possessing, using 
or selling intoxicating liquor. 
There has been a general assumption that the Liquor 
Control Act of the State of Utah in Title 32, U.C.A. 
1953, completely preempted the field of liquor regu-
lation and control; this is not so. Our courts have never 
held that the state has preempted this field. On the 
contrary, they have held that where a general grant of 
power is given unless expressly prohibited, cities may 
pass concurrent ordinances and regulations covering 
the same area as the state statute so long as the local 
ordinance does not exceed the state law in its require-
ments. 
"Does Sec. 57-5-14, R.S.U. 1933, being of 
state-wide application and designed to prevent 
driving anywhere in the state while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, prevent the en-
actment of an ordinance preventing in the cities 
the same thing? 
"The solution of this question depends on the 
following principle: An ordinance dealing with 
the same subject as a statute is invalid only if 
prohibited by the statute or inconsistent there-
with." (Cases cited). Salt Lake City vs. Kusse, 
97 Utah 913, 93 P.2d 671, 1938. 
In the case of American Fork v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 
134< p. 739 ( 1913) , this court considered a case involving 
local ordinances controlling intoxicating liquor. 
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"In view of the several provisions of the 
statutes we have quoted above, can any reason-
able doubt exist in the mind of any one that the 
Legislature intended to and did convey ample 
power upon the municipalities of this state to 
pass ordinances prohibiting and punishing the 
sale or other disposition in any manner within the 
corporate jurisdiction of intoxicating liquors, and 
this may be done although the statutes of the 
state likewise prohibit and punish such sales 
and disposition·~ The overwhelming weight of 
authority in this country is to the effect that, 
where such power is conferred upon municipali-
ties, they may prohibit and punish the same acts 
that are prohibited and punished by the state 
laws, and may impose the same penalties im-
posed by the state laws, if within the jurisdiction 
of the municipal courts. 2 McQuillin, Mun. 
Corps. §§877, 878; 28 Cyc. 696; Black on Int. 
Simmons, 4 Okla. Cr. 662, 112 Pac. 951; same 
case on rehearing, 5 Okla. Cr. 399, 115 Pac. 
380, where the authorities upon the subject are 
reviewed in an exhaustive opinion. To the same 
effect is Oklahoma City v. Spence (Okla. Cr.) 
126 Pac. 701." 
There is some belief that Ri,ggins vs. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 
( 1935), holds the 1935 Utah Liquor Control Act com-
pletely preempted the field but when read in full con-
text, it is readily discernible that the court was talking 
about the state's role of being in business, to-wit, selling 
intoxicating liquor through its own liquor stores. The 
court was not concerned with the question of regulation 
of consumption, but with protecting a state owned 
monopoly. We quote: 
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'_''¥ e are unable to perceive any constitutional 
objections to the state engaging in the sale and 
distribution of intoxicating liquors. The author-
ity of the Legislature under its police power to 
r~gulat~ and prohibit traffic in intoxicating 
liquors is too well established to admit or debate. 
Notwithstanding the repeal of the prohibition 
clause of our State Constitution, the Legislature 
may entirely prohibit the manufacture, sale, and 
use of intoxicating liquor. No constitutional 
rights of the plaintiffs are infringed because the 
Legislature has seen fit to provide that the state 
shall occupy the entire field, or nearly so, of the 
sale and distribution of intoxicating liquors. 
Such in effect is the holding of this court in the 
case of Utah Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Stewart, 
8 2Utah 198, 23 P. (2d) 229. Numerous authori-
ties sustaining such legislative powers will be 
found collected in that case." 
The court finally decided that the Liquor Commission 
had standing to sue in a civil action to enjoin various 
businesses from selling intoxicating liquor. 
Procedurally, the duty falls upon the party attack-
ing the ordinance to establish the invalidity of the ordi-
nance in question. 
"It is a familiar rule of law that, where cities 
are given general power to pass an ordinance 
upon a given subject, the presumption .Prevails 
that ordinances passed upon that subject are 
valid until the contrary is made to appear and 
that the burden of showing their invalidity is 
upon the person .assailing them. After alh~d~np­
to this presumption the author of McQmllm s 
Mun. Ords. Sec. 384 says: 'Therefore, the gen-
15 
eral rule is that, when the validity of an ordinance 
is called in question, the burden is upon the party 
who denies the validity to demonstrate it by 
proper proof, as where the question of the lack 
of power to enact is raised.' ". Am. Fork vs. 
Charlier, up. cit. 
Under Section 10-8-42, U.C.A. 1953, defendant 
has received a general grant to regulate intoxicating 
liquor. The burden thus falls upon plaintiff to establish 
that the state enactments covering intoxicating liquors 
have expressly prohibited the local governing agencies 
from passing ordinances which regulate but do not cir-
cumvent the state laws. Therefore, until plaintiff firmly 
proves an express prohibition, the presumption of the 
validity of the ordinance now in question must prevail. 
This they have not done. 
POINT IV 
SALT LAKE CITY'S ORDINANCE LICENS-
ING THE NONPROFIT SOCIAL CLUBS, 
ATHLETIC AND RECREATIONAL ASSOCI-
ATIONS IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
We can see from the foregoing arguments that the 
local governing body has been granted the authority 
to pass an ordinance licensing and regulating nonprofit 
clubs and associations. In considering the provisions of 
the ordinance being attached, this court in its right of 
judicial review must limit itself to the question of 
whether the requirements of the ordinance are unreason-
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able and discriminatory beyond constitutional guaran-
tee. This general rule of law is best stated in 33 Am. 
J ur., Licenses, Section 18: 
"Discretion of Legislature; Province of Courts. 
It is the province of the legislature to determine 
whether the conditions exist which warrant the 
exercise of the power to regulate or to license 
under the police power, but the question as to 
what are proper subject of its exercise is clearly 
a judicial one. In this respect, the legislature 
has a wise discretion in determining whether a 
business or occupation shall be barred to the dis-
honest or incompetent, and courts will not pass 
upon the question of the wisdom of the legis-
lature in requiring a license from a certain class 
of persons to correct an extortionate practice 
found to exist on the part of such persons." 
Inasmuch as appellant has attacked the ordinance 
section by section in the appendix to his brief, we will 
briefly review the main areas covered by the ordinance. 
1. There are three classes of license under the 
ordinance. It is well settled law that the governing 
body may classify establishments or persons into various 
areas requiring a different fee to be paid so long as 
the discriminatory is not discriminatory or unreason-
able. Salt Lake City vs. Christensen Co., 34 U. 38, 95 
P. 523, 17 A.L.R. (N.S.) 898; Clark v. Titusville, 
184 U.S. 329, 22 S.Ct. 382, 46 L.Ed. 569; Menlove 
v. Salt Lake County, 18 U.2d 203, 418 P.2d 227; 
Howe v. State Tax Commission, IO U.2d 362, 353 P.2d 
468, and McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edi-
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tion Revised, §26.60. These classes are completely rea-
sonable as they are based on the activities of the licensee 
and all persons similarly situated are treated alike. 
2. Sections 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 and 19 simply require 
that the clubs, regardless of their classification, abide 
laws of general acceptance in the field of health pro-
tection, fire protection and protection against violation 
of criminal laws. These requirements are reiterations 
of state enactments and are in no way additional burdens 
upon the clubs as they apply to all persons in society. 
Sections 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 
are administrative in character and simply deal with 
the application of other sections of the ordinance. Sec-
tions 5, 7 and 9 deal with the necessary information 
that must be included in the application for the license. 
They require identification of the responsible officers 
and directors of the club or association who change 
from year to year and the statement that in case of beer 
or liquor consumption, the officers and employees are 
abiding by state law. Furthermore, the contents of 
section 9 are taken from Section 16-6-13.1 which re-
quires the posting of bylaws or house rules of a non-
profit corporation. 
3. The requirement of filing a financial report 
with the application for license as indicated under sec-
tion r and allowing the license assessor immediate 
access to the books of the club as stated in section 10 
has been challenged by both the state and the private 
clubs. Inasmuch as we are dealing here with nonprofit 
organizations who are being licensed under a single 
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license and at a greatly reduced fee compared with the 
fees paid by a business who sponsor the same activities, 
it is of paramount interest that the city know whether 
the club is, in fact, organized as a nonprofit entity 
but in reality operating for pecuniary profit. By the 
requirement of filing a financial statement and allowing 
immediate access to the books, the city can ascertain 
whether it should assess the normal business licen.se fee 
as required for all businesses similarly situated. It may, 
therefore, license each separate activity of the club if 
the club is, in fact, a business organization. The city 
must be allowed to look past the outward facade of 
a nonprofit organization to ascertain whether it is prop-
erly being regulated under the powers given by the 
state. 
Because of the rather privileged position of the 
liquor locker club to store liquor on its premises, un-
scrupulous individuals may use a nonprofit organzation 
as a sham to avoid law enforcement. This type of action 
may be readily ascertained upon reading the financial 
statement and auditing the books. The State of Utah 
pays to Salt Lake City a portion of its liquor profits 
to enforce the liquor laws of this state, but now turns 
around and requires that law enforcement officers of 
the city be denied the means of discovering unscrupu-
lous individuals who would by deception avoid such 
enforcement. Because the city is required to regulate 
social organizations differently than business organiza-
tions ,the governing body has the right to check into 
their internal affairs to ascertain any improprieties. 
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'Vhen dealing with liquor consumption, one must 
be cognizant that this is not a constitutional right given 
to any organization or individual but is a privilege given 
pursuant to the police power which has been delegated 
to respondent by the appellant. 
POINT V 
IN THE C 0 N S 0 L I DATED CASES 
BROUGHT BY THE NONPROFIT CORPO-
RATION CLUBS AGAINST SALT LAKE 
CITY, THE COURT DID ERR IN RULING 
THAT THE MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCE-
l\1ENT OFFICERS ARE REQUIRED TO PRO-
CURE A PROPER SEARCH WARRANT 
PRIOR TO THEIR INSPECTING THE CLUB 
ROOlVI OF SUCH NONPROFIT CORPORA-
TIONS. 
Section 16-6-14 U.C.A. 1953, makes as a condition 
of the existence of these clubs the requirement that they 
allow immediate access to the peace officers of this state. 
In the court's memorandum decision, it held that it was 
not striking down this provision of state law. (R 7-9) 
It nevertheless required that local officers procure 
search warrants before entering the clubs for an inspec-
tion. These two findings are inconsistent. 
The right to organize a liquor locker club is not 
a constitutional right but a privilege granted by the 
state subject to certain restraints and regulations as 
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contained in the enacting statutes. The nonprofit cor-
poration~ who organize under the liquor locker club 
provisions have agreed to allow ready access to their 
premises by peace officers of the state, county and local 
governments. 
Protection of a right can only apply when there 
is a right in existence. Because an individual has certain 
inalienable rights, it does not necessarily follow that 
organizations fall heir to these same righti; simply be-
cause individuals are associated therewith. Again we 
must consider that no person or entity has any rights 
in the use, possession or storage of liquor except those 
given by the state puri;uant to its police power. 
When a group of people desire to organize a non-
profit liquor locker club and gain those privileges that 
are granted by the state, they must be willing to accept 
the conditions associated with such privileges. When 
plaintiffs agreed to the condition allowing unlimited 
access to their premises by peace officers, they have no 
rights which may be protected under the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
and Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
To hold as the trial court did in this matter is to 
frustrate the very intention of the Legislature which 
passed the liquor locker club law. The Legislature obvi-
ously by its inclusion of Section 16-6-14 intended that 
the liquor laws not be frustrated by locked doors which 
could only be opened by keys or other devices held by 
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members of said club. The time delay effected by requir-
ing the local enforcement officers to await the opening 
of said doors would give ample opportunity to un-
scrupulous individuals to eliminate all evidence of wrong 
doing and thus thwart the commands of the state liquor 
code and makes it almost impossible for the law enforce-
ment officers to discover such violations. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial courts who heard these two different case~ 
did not err in holding that the city had the right and 
power to license social clubs, athletic and recreational 
associations and that they held the power to license and 
regulate these clubs in regards to their activities revolv-
ing around the consumption of liquor. Judge Aldon J. 
Anderson, after much study and research, being com-
pletely and properly advised when he made his decision, 
held that the State of Utah was not the proper party 
to challenge the constitutionality of the state statutes 
involved herein and of the ordinance being attacked. 
The trial court in Case No. 1117 4, when confronted with 
the actual parties to be regulated, fully upheld the city's 
position that the state had not preempted to itself regu-
lation of nonprofit corporations operating as liquor 
locker clubs but did err in holding that local peace 
officers were required to obtain a search warrant before 
the club need allow them access to their premises. As a 
condition of their existence, these nonprofit private 
clubs agreed to immediate access by law enforcement 
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officers to the premises of the clubs. We feel from our 
foregoing argument that there can be no doubt that 
the holding of the trial courts be upheld except for that 
portion of Judge Keller's decision requiring our local 
enforcement officers to first procure a search warrant 
before investigation of private clubs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOL1\1GREN 
City Attorney 
PAUL G. GRANT 
Assistant City Attorney 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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